Hall of Mirrors: Section 6.3: Einstein’s attempt to define physical existence

In the last section of General Relativity Einstein attempted to define our existentially closed system, ie physical existence. He started by referring to an earlier section, where he wrote: Classical mechanics starts out from the following law: Material particles sufficiently far removed from other material particles continue to move uniformly in a straight line or continue in a state of rest. We have also repeatedly emphasised that this fundamental law can only be valid for bodies of reference K which possess certain unique states of motion, and which are in uniform translational motion relative to each other. Relative to other reference-bodies K the law is not valid. Both in classical mechanics and in the special theory of relativity we therefore differentiate between reference-bodies K relative to which the recognised “laws of nature” can be said to hold, and reference-bodies K’ relative to which these laws do not hold. 

This rendition of the law can be written more precisely by eliminating the misleading distinction between ‘moving’ and ‘at rest’, since everything is moving. That then illuminates the fact that while the statement is true, it is also a statement of the obvious, and as such, meaningless. By definition, if any given existent entity does not encounter any given physical effect which could alter its movement, then it will continue to have that movement.

Einstein took issue with this: This fundamental law can only be valid for bodies of reference K which possess certain unique states of motion, and which are in uniform translational motion relative to each other. Relative to other reference-bodies K’ the law is not valid.

That it is true, so long as it is understood that this is an assertion about observation, not reality. The classicists were referring to reality. That is, the law is a statement of an actual, albeit within a closed system, not a function of any given reference. Any given physically existent attribute can be compared to any other, and within that specified confine the outcome is valid, but that does not mean it is the actuality. Such a process is fundamentally pointless. More importantly, it becomes invalid when reality is conflated with a representation of it. 

Einstein continued: If we ponder over the question as to how the universe, considered as a whole, is to be regarded, the first answer that suggests itself to us is surely this: As regards space (and time) the universe is infinite. This is invalid, see Section 2.1. The author: We cannot transcend our own existence, and can never have knowledge, as opposed to belief, of any other possibility. Which means we are confined to an existentially closed system, and the issue becomes how to determine validity from within that, given its inherent nature. 

We cannot know anything that is extrinsic to our existentially closed system. The notion of infinity is a belief, ie a possible alternative, since physical existence, as manifest to us, must be finite. The issue is that finite must ultimately finish, otherwise it is not finite. For us, from within that confine, the fact that finite must finish results in a relentless sequence of possibilities which we cannot know and has no end. Section 2.1: There is always the possibility of a mutually exclusive alternative, ie if A, there must be the possibility of not-A. For each subsequent ‘A’, there is the possibility of another ‘not-A’. In other words, we are unable to resolve this conundrum objectively, and (Section 2.1) must accept, when it is the case, that being unknowable is the proper scientific decision, rather than invoking a belief system in an attempt to solve the unsolvable.

Einstein asserted: The development of non-Euclidean geometry led to the recognition of the fact, that we can cast doubt on the infiniteness of our space without coming into conflict with the laws of thought or with experience. This is invalid, since the concept which Einstein refers to (see below) is not infinity, and the notion of non-Euclidean geometry, or any other similar idea, being a characteristic of reality is incorrect. 

As explained in Section 2.1:  To be physically existent must entail physical unambiguity. That involves a unique physically existent state of any given ‘entity’, or representation, because different physical versions of them cannot co-exist. Neither can more than one physically existent state occupy the same spatial position at the same time. Thus, at any given time, unique physically existent states of some ‘substance’ exist independently of sensory detection, and have altered from the preceding existent version thereof. Therefore, physical existence is an existential sequence, of which there can only ever be one occurrence at a time, ie a reality. The frequency of alteration being determined by the quickest type(s) of attribute change, and the overall rate of alteration is one unit of duration, assuming constancy.

Similarly, that underlying physical unambiguity means that the sequence itself must progress incrementally. Every physically existent state, and its spatial position, must comprise whatever constitutes the next in the sequence, and that must involve only one degree of difference (a change) in any given attribute of that state. When considering any given existent state, and comparing it to its previous existence, change will have occurred in at least one of its attributes, but not necessarily all of them. 

The differentiation of realities is a function of one degree of change in any given attribute, not some arbitrary percentage, and/or type. Any other circumstance presupposes that a reality both exists and is altering concurrently, which is an impossibility. This means, any reality is purely a spatial phenomenon. The notion of duration arises from physical existence being a sequence, which is actually a succession of discrete realities.

Hence, the usual, understandable, view that our existence involves ‘entities’ which persist whilst also undergoing alteration, is incorrect. This also applies to representations. The misconception that entities or representations exist in the same state over many durations is a reflection of the continued manifestation of certain superficial physical attributes. We tend to only deem them to have changed when the extent of the alteration reaches an arbitrary point. This perspective represents a higher-level conceptualisation of physical existence. 

An analogy would be a film, where an illusion of continuity is created, but actually only one frame is being shown at a time. While the effect is similar, the difference is that the frames shown, and the frames as yet unshown, all exist at the same time. Whereas, with physical existence only a unique physically existent state occurs at any given time, whilst what did happen has ceased to exist, and what will occur does not yet exist. The implication being that whatever constitutes the elementary components (‘substance’) which comprise physical existence must be what continue to exist, ie each reality is a different configuration of these.

That is, nothing alters in any given manifestation of reality. The difference is between the manifestations of reality as the sequence progresses. The reason it supposedly does not come into conflict with the laws of thought or with experience, is because the hypothesis of Relativity concerns observation, not reality. 

Einstein: Let us consider a second two-dimensional existence on a spherical surface instead of a plane. The flat beings with their measuring-rods and other objects fit exactly on this surface and they are unable to leave it. Their whole universe of observation extends exclusively over the surface of the sphere. Are these beings able to regard the geometry of their universe as being plane geometry and their rods as the realisation of “distance”? They cannot do this. For if they attempt to realise a straight line, they will obtain a curve, which we “three-dimensional beings” designate as a great circle, i.e. a self-contained line of definite finite length, which can be measured up by means of a measuring-rod. Similarly, this universe has a finite area that can be compared with the area of a square constructed with rods. The great charm resulting from this consideration lies in the recognition of the fact that the universe of these beings is finite and yet has no limits.

This is incorrect, as it does not have no limits, as in the proper definition of infinite, it is just a circle, or a sphere. Einstein was at liberty to invoke whatever beliefs he wanted, but not to assert them under the guise of fact. A straight line, in any given direction, cannot, by definition, be drawn on a sphere. Again, by definition, progressing in a ‘straight line’ on a sphere will delineate a circle eventually, as such a line must return to its start point. These simple facts are not necessarily transferable to the notion that the universe (physical existence) must be a sphere. The actual shape of the universe cannot be known, as that involves being extrinsic to our own existentially closed system. 

Einstein: On their spherical surface our flat beings would find this ratio smaller than π, the difference being the more considerable, the greater the radius of the circle in comparison with the radius of the “world-sphere.” By means of this relation the spherical beings can determine the radius of their universe (“world”), even when only a relatively small part of their world-sphere is available for their measurements. But if this part is very small indeed, they will no longer be able to demonstrate that they are on a spherical “world” and not on a Euclidean plane, for a small part of a spherical surface differs only slightly from a piece of a plane of the same size. 

Einstein: For a plane surface, the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter, both lengths being measured with the same rod, is, according to Euclidean geometry of the plane, equal to a constant value π, which is independent of the diameter of the circle. This is an actual, the caveats of the same rod, Euclidean geometry, and independent are irrelevant. Either a measurement is carried out properly, or it is not. As happened earlier, when a flawed methodology was deployed to measure distance with the result that Einstein derived a different outcome, even though the distance remained unaltered, now Einstein proposed that by virtue of these caveats, the ratio is less than π. 

Thus if the spherical surface beings are living on a planet of which the solar system occupies only a negligibly small part of the spherical universe, they have no means of determining whether they are living in a finite or in an infinite universe, because the “piece of universe” to which they have access is in both cases practically plane, or Euclidean. It follows directly from this discussion, that for our sphere-beings the circumference of a circle first increases with the radius until the “circumference of the universe” is reached, and that it thenceforward gradually decreases to zero for still further increasing values of the radius. During this process the area of the circle continues to increase more and more, until finally it becomes equal to the total area of the whole “world-sphere.”

One key word is practically. In reality, it is either flat, or it is not. This is a general flaw in Einstein’s thinking. For example, when considering clocks, he considered being sufficiently close as equivalent to occupying the same spatial position, which it is not. This fallacy is exposed when a definition is required as to what constitutes being practically/sufficiently close/about the same as/etc, as there must be a point at which this is no longer valid. Then an explanation is needed as to why that extra instance of differentiation justified the notion that there has been change, instead of it being at some preceding instance. 

Whether or not there is an ability to detect the nature of the surface is irrelevant. This, and the latter part of this statement, is similar in form to Einstein’s misrepresentation of Galileo, and his attempt to argue that Relativity was still valid in some way, even when a critical condition had been abandoned. Einstein imbues humans with the ability to alter reality by their perception, which is obviously an invalid concept, since physical existence occurs independently of its sensory detection, and has already happened by then. 

Neither does it follow that for our sphere-beings the circumference of a circle first increases with the radius until the “circumference of the universe” is reached, and that it thenceforward gradually decreases to zero for still further increasing values of the radius. The actual shape of the universe is unknowable.

Einstein then admitted to his presumption: Perhaps the reader will wonder why we have placed our “beings” on a sphere rather than on another closed surface. But this choice has its justification in the fact that, of all closed surfaces, the sphere is unique in possessing the property that all points on it are equivalent. I admit that the ratio of the circumference c of a circle to its radius r depends on r, but for a given value of r it is the same for all points of the “world-sphere”; in other words, the “world-sphere” is a “surface of constant curvature.”

His argument is circular, and therefore meaningless. The fact that the sphere is unique in possessing the property that all points on it are equivalent is irrelevant. Obviously, the ratio of the circumference c of a circle to its radius r depends on r, in that the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter is a constant, ie π. That is, this notion of a dependency is false, as the two dimensions are in a fixed spatial relationship, by definition. Which means, as the radius alters the circumference alters accordingly, otherwise it would no longer be a circle/sphere. This is admitted by Einstein: but for a given value of r it is the same for all points of the “world-sphere”; in other words, the “world-sphere” is a “surface of constant curvature.”. There is no but, it is a fact. Einstein was trying to make a statement of the obvious appear meaningful, and invoke the possibility of an alternative which does not exist.

Einstein then asserted: According to the general theory of relativity, the geometrical properties of space are not independent, but they are determined by matter. Thus we can draw conclusions about the geometrical structure of the universe only if we base our considerations on the state of the matter as being something that is known. We know from experience that, for a suitably chosen co-ordinate system, the velocities of the stars are small as compared with the velocity of transmission of light. We can thus as a rough approximation arrive at a conclusion as to the nature of the universe as a whole, if we treat the matter as being at rest.

We already know that the behaviour of measuring-rods and clocks is influenced by gravitational fields, i.e. by the distribution of matter. This in itself is sufficient to exclude the possibility of the exact validity of Euclidean geometry in our universe. But it is conceivable that our universe differs only slightly from a Euclidean one, and this notion seems all the more probable, since calculations show that the metrics of surrounding space is influenced only to an exceedingly small extent by masses even of the magnitude of our sun. We might imagine that, as regards geometry, our universe behaves analogously to a surface which is irregularly curved in its individual parts, but which nowhere departs appreciably from a plane: something like the rippled surface of a lake. Such a universe might fittingly be called a quasi-Euclidean universe. As regards its space it would be infinite. But calculation shows that in a quasi-Euclidean universe the average density of matter would necessarily be nil. Thus such a universe could not be inhabited by matter everywhere.

This statement is invalid. It has similarities with Einstein’s attempts to link Gravitational theory and Relativity, and thereby present Relativity with a justification it does not possess. The false start is: the geometrical properties of space are not independent, but they are determined by matter. This is stated to be a function of the general theory of relativity. Which it is, once it is realised what that notion actually means according to Einstein. Because Relativity, whether as manifest in the so-called special circumstances, or generally, is a hypothesis about human observation, not reality. This is confirmed in a subsequent sentence: We know from experience that, for a suitably chosen co-ordinate system, the velocities of the stars are small as compared with the velocity of transmission of light. The conclusion asserted by Einstein is invalid: Thus we can draw conclusions about the geometrical structure of the universe only if we base our considerations on the state of the matter as being something that is known. From within our existentially closed system we can conclude, on the basis of properly established knowledge, the nature of that system, but nothing else. 

The next false statement was: We already know from our previous discussion that the behaviour of measuring-rods and clocks is influenced by gravitational fields, i.e. by the distribution of matter. Whether any given timing device, or distance measuring device, is affected in some way by any given gravitational field is irrelevant. These devices are assumed, in order to carry out their function, to be unaffected, whether that is virtue of construction, or compensation for know affects. Otherwise, the measuring system is useless. This is how, in effect, all such devices for any given measuring system act as if they were one device, with the measurement being compared to a generic conceptualisation of the attribute being considered. That alone is why the following statement is incorrect: This in itself is sufficient to exclude the possibility of the exact validity of Euclidean geometry in our universe. More importantly, it is invalid because what we can know about our existentially closed system is that it is a sequence of manifestations, each of which involves no alteration, ie Euclidean geometry is relevant. 

Einstein then caveated that with the flawed notion of slightly. Again, either ‘it’ ‘is’, or not. There is no equivalent state as ‘nearly’. This is based on a presumption anyway, about how the universe differs, indicated by the word conceivable, which needs to be proven first, otherwise, yet again, the argument is self-fulfilling. 

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