This section explains the nature of our existentially closed system.
2.1.1 The nature of the closed system
By definition, there is always the possibility of a mutually exclusive alternative, ie if A, there must be the possibility of not-A. Assuming A to be our ‘being’, whatever that is, then while there could be an alternative, that is irrelevant as we cannot be of both A and not-A. We cannot transcend our own existence, and can never have knowledge, as opposed to belief, of any other possibility. Which means we are confined to an existentially closed system, and the issue becomes how to determine validity from within that, given its inherent nature.
With a closed system, the pursuit of due scientific process within it does not entail presumptions, if they are consistent with its nature. Indeed, such an approach is a necessity, because the consequences are that there is a ‘boundary’ beyond which nothing is knowable, and there are fundamental ‘rules’ concerning how it occurs. Not imposing such parameters, let alone using invalid ones, though appearing a more intellectual form of analysis, will, other than by fortuitous coincidence, result in a construct of belief rather than knowledge.
Without such constraints, all statements would have to be regarded as equally valid, since no reference is available for verification, ie it would be impossible to differentiate knowledge and belief. It is irrelevant that some judgements may seem more plausible, either the judgement is based on something that is in accord with the nature of our physical existence, or it is not. This process must involve a proper system of referencing in order to identify actuals, and, by definition, no extrinsic (‘absolute’) reference is available.
So, the issues are to identify what feature enables verification of whether any given ‘something’ is of our existentially closed system, or not, and to understand how knowledge can be developed solely on that basis. We must accept, when it is the case, that being unknowable is the proper scientific decision, rather than invoking a belief system in an attempt to solve the unsolvable.
2.1.2 The nature of knowledge
The epistemological problem is how to develop knowledge from within a closed system. Most statements are a form of judgement involving two caveats. First, the structure of it is fundamentally of the form ‘with respect to’. Second, there must be a context. Sometimes the latter is not overtly identified as it was not realised; but mainly it is not acknowledged because it is obvious, and hence unnecessarily repetitive. Put simply, something is defined by comparing, and differentiating, it from something else, within a specified circumstance.
As we are constrained in a closed system, we are able to determine actuals, albeit only within it, since there is a finite number of possibilities. Logically, the ensuing process of comparison entails referencing any given manifestation of an attribute with every other one. Any specific example could be the reference, as the purpose is to identify differences, ie so long as a constancy of reference is maintained it is irrelevant what it is. The critical requirement is constancy, which could involve adjustments to compensate for known variations.
With a closed system, even if the correct procedures have been maintained, our knowledge can only ever be regarded as ‘proven up to that point’. This reflects the nature of the process, and does not imply any degree of subjectivity, or that there is no limit to what is knowable. Ultimately, the knowledge established could be accepted as the equivalent of our closed system, ie a correct, and comprehensive, explanation of that from within it. But as we are confined to that system, we will only become aware of that by default, ie when no new knowledge is revealed by the process of comparison.
2.1.3 The nature of physical existence
Sensorial detectability is the feature that enables determination of whether something is of our existentially closed system, or not. It is concerned with the processes involving interactions between whatever existed, and certain physically existent phenomena, which result in the creation of representations of what occurred. There is an exception, in that this cannot be limited solely to direct experience, ie the presumption that all the sensory systems available, and not just those of humans, are able to detect everything. But such instances must only be confirmed on the basis of logical deduction from what has been verifiably established by direct experience, and not an assertion based on belief.
Therefore, physical existence (ie our closed system) at any given time comprises whatever is physically existent, and physically existent representations of what previously existed. Though these representations only result from interactions with what occurred, they then exist independently of that. Moreover, they are independent of the sensory processes which have evolved to detect them. That is, physical existence occurs irrespective of those processes, neither can they affect it as it has already happened. If all sensory processes were eliminated then there would just be no awareness of it, but it would still exist. Which was the circumstance which prevailed before these sensory systems developed.
To be physically existent must, by definition, entail physical unambiguity, involving a physically existent state of any given ‘entity’, or representation, because different physical versions of such cannot co-exist. Neither can more than one physically existent state occupy the same spatial position at the same time. Thus, at any given time, unique physically existent states of some ‘substance’ exist independently of sensory detection.
The next consideration is whether alteration is involved, or not. If not, then physical existence would be the same physically existent ‘substance’ in the same physically existent state, ad infinitum, ie a solid state. As comparisons at different times reveal differences, there must be alteration. That is, at any given time, unique physically existent states of some ‘substance’ exist independently of sensory detection, and have altered from the preceding existent version thereof. [At the generic level, what constitutes ‘substance’, ‘physically existent state’, ‘alteration’, etc, is irrelevant detail].
The issue then becomes reconciling the apparent contradiction between being physically existent, which necessitates substance in a definitive state and spatial position, at any given time, and alteration, which involves changes to that. The resolution of that conundrum lies in the nature of sequence, whereby any change results in the next step in the sequence, and the cessation of the preceding one. Therefore, physical existence is an existential sequence, of which there can only ever be one occurrence at a time, ie a reality. The frequency of alteration being determined by the quickest type(s) of attribute change, and the overall rate of alteration is one unit of duration, assuming constancy.
Similarly, that underlying unambiguity means that the sequence itself must progress incrementally. Every physically existent state, and its spatial position, must comprise whatever constitutes the next in the sequence, and that must involve only one degree of difference (a change) in any given attribute of that state. When considering any given existent state, and comparing it to its previous existence, change will have occurred in at least one of its attributes, but not necessarily all of them. There is no implication that all possible degrees of attribute alteration progress at the same rate.
Invoking more than one degree of change raises the issue as to how many would then be the determinant, since either there is a change in any given attribute, or there is not. Being similar is irrelevant. Any given ‘entity’, or representation, is not the same if there has been any change, irrespective of how few have occurred, or what was involved, ie it is not of the same reality. The differentiation of realities is a function of one degree of change in any given attribute, not some arbitrary percentage, and/or type. Any other circumstance presupposes that a reality both exists and is altering concurrently, which is an impossibility as physical existence is unambiguous. This means, any given reality is purely a spatial phenomenon. The notion of duration (as opposed to ‘at a time’) arises from physical existence appearing to have a continuity, whereas it is actually unambiguous of discrete realities.
Hence, the usual, understandable, view that our existence involves ‘entities’ which persist whilst also undergoing alteration, is incorrect. This also applies to representations. Though in that case, there is a tendency for them not to be thought of as being physically existent, and/or independently so, in the first place. Also, there is very little recognition, given their inherent physical characteristics (as explained below), that they actually do not maintain the same physically existent state over more than one unit of duration.
The misconception that entities or representations exist in the same state over many durations is a reflection of the continued manifestation of certain superficial physical attributes. We tend to only deem them to have changed when the extent of the alteration reaches an arbitrary point. This perspective represents a higher-level conceptualisation of physical existence.
An analogy would be a film, where an illusion of continuity is created, but actually only one frame is being shown at a time. While the effect is similar, the difference is that the frames shown, and the frames as yet unshown, all exist at the same time. Whereas, with physical existence only a unique physically existent state occurs at any given time, whilst what did happen has ceased to exist, and what will occur does not yet exist. The implication being that whatever constitutes the elementary components (‘substance’) which comprise physical existence must be what continue to exist, ie each reality is a different configuration of these.
Apart from the concept of entity/representation as usually understood being invalid, so too is the implication that there is a difference between them at the fundamental level, as they are both a discrete physically existent state of some form of substance. However, the objective is to develop knowledge, and the language that has evolved on the basis of this misconception must be used for that purpose. Furthermore, without the, albeit false, notion of ‘something which alters’ that enables our arrangement of what occurs into some form of order for the sake of comprehension, there are then only the elementary components. Attempting to develop an analysis based on those would be impossible, given the complexity of what is involved, and the speed at which alteration occurs. Some degree of higher-level conceptualisation is inevitable, but that must be understood, and not conflated with reality.
The important points are that physical existence (our closed system):
-comprises whatever is physically existent, and existent representations of what happened
-exists independently of the sensory processes which have evolved to detect it
-involves physical substance in a unique physically existent state and spatial position, ie it is
an existential sequence involving only one occurrence (a reality) at a time
-has a frequency of transition in realities which is determined by the quickest form(s) of change in any given attribute, and a rate of alteration of one unit of duration
-involves realities that are purely a spatial phenomenon. The notion of a greater duration reflects the sequence of realities, not any given reality.
-comprises whatever constitutes its elementary components, each reality being a different configuration thereof.
Overall, what seems to be ‘something’, whether an entity or a representation, does not continue to exist in the same physically existent state, and the two must not be conflated.
2.1.4 The nature of the future
With respect to what is referred to as the future, there is no validity in any notion of change to it, or that it can have some influence, as there is nothing in existence to affect, or cause an effect. This interpretation implies that it is already existent, which it is not. The proper depiction is: the circumstance where a subsequent existent state in the sequence occurred that was different to what would otherwise have occurred, had the causal factors been different. Which is meaningless, since every step in the sequence is a function of preceding conditions, and any outcome would be different if they had been different. Obviously, given proven trends in the relevant conditions, it is possible to extrapolate what alteration any given existent state might undergo with a significant degree of certainty, but that does not mean it has become physically existent.
2.1.5 The nature of sensory detection
We can only become aware of what existed from what is manifested to us via certain physical processes (light, sound, etc). The resultant representations are independently physically existent, and potentially receivable sensorially. Knowledge can then be developed either on the basis of validated direct experience, or by logical deduction therefrom. This includes any proven sensory process, and is not limited to human experience. The caveat of potentiality relates to issues with the physical processes involved, as explained below. This paper is only concerned with the process up to the point of interception of a representation (ie receipt) by the appropriate sensory system, and not what happens subsequently.
When any representation is received, which necessitates being in its line of travel, it ceases to exist in that state. That applies to any interaction, not just one with the appropriate sensory system. Receipt entails detection of a representation of what has already occurred. Hence, no hypothesis which purports to explain physical existence can rely on any implication that the receipt itself, or its subsequent processing, has any effect on it. Though that process is important in itself, and involves many variable factors, but that is a different issue.
The common physical traits in the different types of representations led to the evolution of sensory systems, as the ability to receive, and then process, them afforded the advantage of an awareness of the environment. These are consistency, and regularity, of occurrence, stability of physically existent state, and the omnipresence of the physical phenomena which enable them. Therefore, when representations are considered at a higher-level than their physically existent state, it can be assumed any interaction with any given existent state results in a range of representations of it which are similar. Also, interactions with other entities which have superficially common characteristics result in similar outcomes. Subsequently, they are not unduly affected by most physical effects encountered whilst travelling.
However, functionally they are just representations of whatever existed, which while sufficient in the context of survival, are deficient when used to establish what they depict. This relates to the physical processes involved in their creation and transmission:
1 The relationship between the occurrence and any type of representational effect:
Every occurrence is too complex, ie too numerous, frequent, varied, for the capabilities of any of the phenomena which enable representations to cope with. Therefore, they will be deficient as a depiction of what actually happened. Another possibility is that the occurrence involved a physical property which precluded some aspect of the interaction with any given phenomenon, so no representation of that particular characteristic was generated. Though it might be deducible from other direct experiences. Or, a representational type exists, but no sensory system has evolved, or indirect method developed, to detect it.
2 How the physically existent state of any representational effect is altered by prevailing physical circumstances:
Any representation could be affected by different aspects of the physical environment it interacts with whilst travelling, and thereby altered from its original state. This could involve delay, distortion, partial elimination, diversion from the original line of travel, etc.
3 A representation is never received:
No appropriate recipient sensory system was in the line of travel whilst it existed.
Therefore, apart from what is required to interpret what was received and then develop a commonly agreed depiction thereof, some reverse engineering is then required in order to equate that with what occurred in reality. But this is not a concern of this paper.
2.1.6 The nature of measurement systems
The underlying purpose of measurement systems is to identify differences. This necessitates the use of a reference that must have consistency in order to ensure the comparability of all the outcomes, validity, ie be in accordance with physical existence, and practicality, ie usable as a reference. As we are in a closed system the process of comparison can identify actuals, albeit only within the system. In this circumstance, any given attribute could be chosen as the reference, and then compared to everything else. But that would be impractical.
That is why measurement systems use a reference which is a generic conceptualisation of the characteristic being quantified. This is then embodied in the measuring devices so that they all function as if they were one device. The reference, per se, is not physically existent. Deficiencies in their construction, or susceptibility to external influences which affect their functioning, must not be confused with variations in reality. For example, in different temperatures metal rulers change in length, but the distance has not altered, or when timing devices cannot maintain a constant rate of ‘tick’ due to some external physical effect, it does not mean that the actual rate of alteration has varied.
2.1.7 The nature of time
Alteration in a physically existent state can involve any form of change in any given attribute. The change itself did not exist; it was a difference between two consecutive states in a sequence. The rates for different types of change will vary, and possibly even for identical attributes if physical circumstances alter. These need to be quantified, both in respect of any particular sequence, and for comparison between sequences. The measurement system for this is known as timing.
Identifying rates of alteration involves counting, and then comparing, the number of changes in different sequences over the same duration. This could involve any existent state, attribute, and either concurrent sequences or otherwise, as it is only the rate of change which is of concern, not what was involved. Therefore, the requirement for this measurement system is a reference with a constant, high frequency, change.
As with all measurement systems, the reference for timing is a generic conceptualisation of what is being quantified. If timing, and language, had been expressed in terms of the reference being a constant numeric sequence of ‘ticks’, this would have emphasised the true nature of the system, and the concept of ‘time’ would have been better understood. That is, ‘at any given tick’ (when), and number of ‘ticks’ (duration). The nomenclature used highlights this with the terms minutes, hours, days, etc, which reflect an early timing device, ie the movement of the earth.
Timing devices are a physical manifestation of the conceptualised reference, and should function as if they were one device, ie synchronised. What causes the ‘tick’ is irrelevant. For example, frequency of crystal oscillation is the actual reference with a quartz device. Timing devices are independent of what is being calculated, ie any physical effect which affects their function does not mean there has been a variation in reality. Conversely, any actual variation in any given rate of alteration in any given attribute does not mean that the reference has altered, as it is, by definition, a hypothetical constant.
2.1.8 The nature of distance
Distance is the spatial difference between any given pair of physically existent states at any given time. It is a spatial quantity reflecting a unique occurrence in terms of when, and what was involved. For there to be a distance whatever is under consideration must exist at the same time, since something that is non-existent cannot have a spatial position, ie they must be part of the same reality. As distance is a difference, it does not physically exist, only the states did in their respective spatial positions at that time.
When measuring distance, in effect a grid of spatial positions is used as the reference. Its optimum unit ‘mesh’ size would be the equivalent of the size of the smallest type of substance(s) in physical existence. A distance can only be expressed properly in terms of spatial units, by comparing spatial positions and identifying the difference. However, it can be expressed in terms of duration, ie x = vt. This is hypothetical, as it is the duration which would have been incurred had any given state, at a known velocity, been able to travel that difference in either direction. But a distance is only manifest once, so misinterpretation of this method of expression can result in the reification of distance, and time.
A distance measurement usually involves the two nearest dimensions of the states involved, but could include a range of dimensions. Anything greater in size than one spatial unit will have a spatial footprint, ie a set of spatial positions ‘occupied’. Dimension is a specific aspect of the ‘spatial footprint’ of a physically existent state, and relates to possible axes of it. Three is the minimum number of spatial dimensions that is ontologically correct at the highest level of conceptualisation. At the existential level, the number of dimensions is half the number of directions a substance the size of one spatial unit could travel on this footprint.
2.1.9 The nature of movement
Movement is alteration in distance. It is revealed when discrete distances in sequences are compared retrospectively. As calculating movement, as opposed to distance, involves sequence, any given entity/representation involved has to be deemed to be the ‘same’ thing over the duration of the measurement, which at the existential level it is not. The comparison of these discrete distances enables the calculation of velocity, which involves speed, ie rate of alteration in distance, and divergence, ie rate of alteration in direction.
For movement the reference needs to be something which is constantly ‘stationary’. But everything is moving. However, as we are in a closed system, that issue can be overcome because the options are finite, and therefore being designated the reference renders whatever it is, in effect, ‘stationary’. In practice, this involves spatial points, identified by something, colloquially known as the start and finish. Calculating movement with respect to such points reveals the actual movement, within the closed system. Whereas, measurements made with respect to something which has a known difference in velocity, vis a vis a valid reference, ie a movement of its own, reveals a derivative movement. The relationship between different movements involves the factor √(1 – v2/V2), where V is the faster moving entity.
The time of occurrence, and spatial position at that time, can only be determined from when, and where, the representations were received. However, as different entities cannot occupy the same spatial position there is always a distance between them, which means there is always a delay between occurrence and the representation being created, and when it was received. Hence, the distance travelled, and the duration thereby incurred, is a function of the spatial position of the occurrence with respect to the position of what became the ‘receiving’ entity when the representation was received. Not the distance between the event and that entity when it happened, or when the representation was received. Therefore, alterations in spatial position whilst any representation is travelling are critical.
The movement of the ‘emitting’ entity is deduced from the receipt of representations of it by the other entity. While an event occurred at a specific time, due to differing spatial positions, when the representation of it was received by various entities will likely vary. This could involve the original differences in spatial position, with respect to the occurrence, remaining the same, or, during the delay there is some alteration in those spatial positions. The circumstance becomes more complicated when a sequence of occurrences is involved.
In a relationship involving a representation, then the path of a representation, at any given t, would be defined by a distance starting from a point on the path of the ‘emitting’ entity at that t (which is also the start of the distance (x) between the entities at that t), to a point on the path of the ‘receiving’ entity, which would be beyond the end point of distance x. The relationship between ‘distance x’ and ‘distance transmission’, at any given t, again involves the factor √(1 – v2/V2). With a representation based on light, V would be the speed of light in that circumstance, but not c, as that is light speed in a hypothetical circumstance.
The Doppler effect is explained as follows:
Assuming a regularity in the sequence, and a constancy of velocity and direction of travel in the ‘emitting’, and ‘receiving’, entities, then the frequency of the sequence, when assessed with respect to the receiving of the representations, will be constant. However, if the relationship of distance, and/or direction, varies from occasion to occasion, then their relative spatial position could vary on each such occasion, and the frequency appear to differ from that emitted to that received.
This is because, as the spatial relationship alters, successive representations have to travel distances which alter at a varying rate. In this circumstance, a sequence measured with respect to the ‘receiving’ entity, either increases or decreases at a rate dependent upon the rate at which relative spatial position is altering whilst each representation is being transmitted. That is, it appears, for the ‘receiving’ entity, to be speeding up/slowing down, even though the actual emitted rate did not change. Without an understanding of this, it can be believed that ‘time’ is altering.